Introduction
Ever since its inception, rationalizability has been a concept intimately linked to the idea of the rationality of the players being commonly known. This intuition has been captured in Bernheim (1984 Bernheim ( , 1986 , Pearce (1984) , Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) , and Tan and Werlang (1988) . In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. Indeed, the results do not require common knowledge of anything, and are valid for games with any number of players.
The stage is set by the following Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability:
Fix a game g, let Z be a (Cartesian) set of action pro…les and let e S be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played. If at every state in e S the actual game is g, everyone is rational and it is mutually known that an action pro…le in Z is played, then the actual action pro…le at each state in e S is rationalizable for g.
Indeed, since every action in Z i arises at some state in e S; and since the action chosen at each state is in Z i ; then each action in Z i is a best response to beliefs whose support is contained in Z i ; so by de…nition, the actions chosen at any state in e S are rationalizable actions.
1
The reader will note that this observation is analogous to the Preliminary Ob-1 For a formal statement of this result, together with full proof, see Section 4.
servation [for Nash Equilibrium] identi…ed in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) .
2
I exploit greatly the fact that this analogy exists, and present my results closely following the style of Aumann and Brandenburger's seminal work.
Though simple, the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability is not without interest. Note that it calls for mutual knowledge of the set of choices, with no need for any higher order knowledge. In particular, it does not call for common knowledge.
For rationality and for the payo¤ functions, not even mutual knowledge is needed; only that the players are in fact rational, and that each knows his own payo¤ function.
In recent years a view has emerged that advocates interpreting solution concepts as eminently imposing restrictions on beliefs, rather than on the actions actually played. 3 This is the context of my second result, which provides su¢ cient conditions for a product of supports of conjectures to constitute a set of pro…les of rationalizable actions.
It is again a result akin to theorem in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) (Theorem A) that which leads to rationalizability of beliefs. And, again, common knowledge plays no role. Here the conjecture of each is a probability distribution on the other's actions. One then has the following theorem: Suppose that at the current state of 2 Indeed, if the collection S contains only one state, the strategies chosen at S constitute a Nash equilibrium and the two Preliminary Observations coincide. 3 See Harsanyi (1973) , Armbruster and Boege (1979) , Aumann (1987) , Tan and Werlang (1988) , Brandenburger and Dekel (1989) and Nyarko (1998) among others.
the world the support of the conjecture of every player i is D i . Suppose that at that state there is mutual knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are rational, and (iii) that for every i the support of player i's conjecture is contained in D i . Then the actions that arise with positive probability under the player's conjectures are rationalizable action pro…les. This is Theorem AB in the paper.
It is worth noting here that this result holds for games with any …nite number of players. This is in contraposition to Theorem A in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) which holds only for two-player games. They handle the n player case in their Theorem B, but to do this they require a common prior and common knowledge of conjectures, in addition to mutual knowledge of payo¤s and of rationality. Those extra assumptions are not required in the present work.
When one advocates the interpretation of equilibrium as equilibrium in beliefs one is compelled to seek for the implications over observed play that follow from the beliefs being in equilibrium. 4 With this in mind I present, as a corollary to Theorem AB, a result that states that under the same hypothesis of Theorem AB not only the supports of conjectures are rationalizable at a state, but the actions chosen at that state are rationalizable as well.
The rest of this paper is aimed at presenting a coherent formulation and proof of the claims made above. In Section 2 I present the formal statement of the results and their proofs. In Section 3 I discuss the results.
The Results
In what follows I follow closely the standard notation and de…nitions as presented in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) . 5 Let a game form G be given, that is, a …nite set N of players, together with a …nite set of actions A i for each player i. Set
A model of G is de…ned to consist of 1. for each player i, a set S i of types and for each type s i of i 2. a probability measure on the set S i := j6 =i S j of (n 1)-tuples of types of the other players, where S i is endowed with the product structure (s i 's theory), 3. an action a i (s i ) of i; and 4. a function g i (s i ) : A ! <, Set S := i2N S i ; and call the members s = (s 1 ; :::; s n ) of S states. The set S is also endowed with the product structure. An event is a measurable subset E of S.
De…ne an extension p ( ; s i ) on S as follows: if E is an event, de…ne p (E; s i ) to be the probability that s i 's theory assigns to fs i 2 S i : (s i ; s i ) 2 Eg : For all i, functions p ( ; s i ), a i (s i ) and g i (s i ) are all assumed to be measurable as a function of the type s i . I also assume that player type s i assigns probability 1 to i being of type s i . For a discussion on these assumptions, check the excellent discussion section in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) .
The interpretation of the model described above is that the type s i of player i chooses action a i (s i ) ; has a payo¤ function of g i (s i ) ; and has probabilistic beliefs on S at state s = (s 1 ; :::; s n ) given by p ( ; s i ) : I write a (s) for (a 1 (s 1 ) ; : : : ; a n (s n )) ; g (s) for (g 1 (s 1 ) ; : : : ; g n (s n )) and call g (s) the game played at s: Given a game g, a model of g is simply a model of the game form associated with g. If x is a function on S and X is a subset of its range, then [x 2 X] denotes the event fs : x (s) 2 Xg : If e S is a subset of S then A e S denotes the action pro…les chosen at e S; that is, A e S = n a 2 A : a (s) = a for some s in e S o : If E is an event de…ne the operator K i on events by
As in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) , knowledge is identi…ed with probability one belief, so
I will denote a point mass probability distribution on s by 1 s and a probability distribution q on a set fs 1 ; : : : ; s n g by q 1 s 1 + + q n s n :
The version of rationalizability that I work with in this paper allows each player to believe that his opponents's actions are correlated.
A set i2N Z i A of action pro…les has the best response property if, for each player i 2 N; every action a i 2 Z i is a best response to a belief q i of player i whose support is a subset of Z i .
An action a i 2 A i is rationalizable if there is a set i2N Z i with the best response property such that a i 2 Z i . The set of pro…les of rationalizable actions is, therefore, the union over all the sets of action pro…les that have the best response property.
An Illustration
Consider a model in which all types of each player i have the same payo¤ function g i as depicted in Figure 2 .1. Thus the game being played is known at every state.
The information structure of the model is depicted in Figure 2 ; rather than C, with an expected payo¤ of
; thus Ann is irrational at s 7 :
This example also serves to illustrate the content of Theorem AB. At state s 2 the support of Ann's conjecture is {c,d}, the support of Bob's conjecture is {C,D}. It is also mutually known at s 2 that: (a) both players are rational, and (b) the support of Ann's conjecture is contaned in {c,d} while the support of Bob's conjecture is contained in {C,D}. Indeed, these supports contain only rationalizable actions and, as the corollary to Theorem AB dictates, the actions chosen at s 2 are also rationalizable.
Theorems, Proofs
I now state and prove the main results of the paper formally.
Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability: Fix g and Z A: Let e S be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is Z=A e S : If at every state in e S the actual game is g, everyone is rational and it is mutually known that a 2 Z then i2N Z i is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and the actions chosen at every state in e S are rationalizable for g.
Proof. Need to show that any action a i in Z i maximizes the expectation of g i given a conjecture whose support is a subset of 
Then i2N C i is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and, therefore, a set of rationalizable action pro…les of g.
Proof. Need to show that any action a i in C i maximizes g i with respect to a conjecture whose support is a subset of C i . Pick a i in C i and hence in D j i for some j. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2 in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) . By assumption, supp j (s) = D j : So j attributes positive probability at s to [a i = a i ]. Also, j attributes probability 1 at s to the following events: i's payo¤ function is g i ; i is rational, and i's conjecture has support contained in D i : So there is a state t at which all four events obtain: i's action is a i ; i's payo¤ function is g i ; i
is rational, and i's conjecture has support contained in
C i and a i maximizes g i with respect to a conjecture whose support is a subset
Lemma L: If i2N E i is a set of pro…les of strategies with the best response property and a i is a best response to a belief with support contained in E i , then a i is a rationalizable action.
Proof. If a i is in E i there is nothing to prove. If this is not the case consider the
the best response property pick an action a j in E 0 j : If a j = a i then, by hypothesis, a j is a best response to a belief with support contained in E j and therefore in E 0 j :
If a j 6 = a i then a j is in E j and hence it is a best response to a belief with support contained in E j and therefore in E Proof. Under the hypotheses of Theorem AB the set i2N C i has the best response property. Since each player i is rational at s the action a i (s) is a best response to a belief with support contained in D i ;which is, by construction, contained in
Hence, by Lemma L, action a i (s) is rationalizable for every player i in N .
3 Discussion a. The Conventional Wisdom. The purpose of this paper is not to argue that the conventional characterizations of rationalizability that rely heavily on common knowledge assumptions are wrong or inadequate; it is simply to point out that alternative characterizations, that do not require common knowledge of anything, are available.
6
This is important to point out because the conventional wisdom leads us too quickly into thinking that there is no natural model of rationalizability other than the one based on common knowledge assumptions.
To wit: literature surveys (such as Gul, 1997, and Bonanno, 1999) present only characterizations of rationalizability that depend on common knowledge assumptions.
Therefore, to the extent that characterizations of rationalizability that do not require common knowledge assumptions were viewed as important by these authors, these results were largely unavailable at the time they wrote their surveys. 7 For example, Brandenburger (1992) suggested that characterizations of Nash equilibrium that do not assume common knowledge of anything seem surprising because "common knowledge plays a role in [justifying correlated rationalizability]" (p.90). Binmore (1990) , in turn, wrote: "To sustain the conclusion that nothing can be said about a game beyond the fact that a 'rationalizable'strategy will be played, one needs an explanation of how it comes about that the player's utilities are commonly known, but nothing whatever is known about their beliefs" (p. 4). Milgrom and Roberts (1991) wrote: "models of learning in games (. Preliminary Observation appears to have features of both perspectives.
Indeed, I believe that to give an appropriate interpretation to the Preliminary
Observation it is useful to adopt a third perspective: one in which there is an observer to the strategic interaction at hand distinct from the players of the game, but an observer whose knowledge and belief about the game is formalized the same way one formalizes the knowledge and the beliefs of the players. I call this the inside observer perspective. Here is a way to adapt this perspective to generate a "local" version of the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability.
A model of G with observer is simply a model of G where each state also speci…es beliefs for the inside observer, that is, a probability measure over the set j2N S j :
Theorem IO: Fix g and Z A: Suppose that at some state s the support of the inside observer's conjecture over the actions of the players is Z. Suppose further that the inside observer knows at s that: payo¤ functions are g, that the players are rational, and that it is mutual knowledge among the players that a 2 Z: Then the inside observer knows that a rationalizable action pro…le is chosen at s.
The proof of this result closely follows the proof of Theorem AB and I omit it here.
Notice that the knowledge of the inside observer is modelled in the same way as d. Independent rationalizability. The notion of rationalizability developed by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) did not allow for correlated conjectures, that is, for beliefs such that knowing about the actions chosen by some players would convey information about the actions to be taken by other players. One may naturally wonder whether characterizations of such notion of independent rationalizability exist along the lines of the ones developed in this paper for (correlated) rationalizability.
The answer to this question is a "quali…ed yes." Characterizations that do not assume common knowledge of anything do exist, although they do require an explicit assumption of the conjectures of the players being independent.
Preliminary Observation for Independent Rationalizability: In addition to the assumptions in the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability, assume that at every state in e S the conjecture of each player i about each other player j are independent of i's conjecture about all other players. Then i2N Z i is a set of independent rationalizable action pro…les for g.
Theorem AB for Independent Rationalizability: In addition to the assumptions in Theorem AB, assume that it is mutual knowledge at s that the conjecture of each player i about each other player j are independent of i's conjecture about all other players. Then i2N C i is a set of independent rationalizable action pro…les for g.
The explicit assumption of independence of conjectures make these result of somewhat limited interest in light of the subjectivist context in which the interactive epistemology literature is currently being developed. It is, nevertheless, important to recall that the standard characterization of independent rationalizability in terms of common knowledge assumptions does requires common knowledge of this indepen-dence (as well as common knowledge of rationality and payo¤s). 10 This means that both the Preliminary Observation and Theorem AB for independent rationalizability are still of interest relative to the well known characterization in terms of common knowledge.
A …nal remark on independent conjectures is in order. One may wonder whether assuming independence can be avoided altogether. I have investigated two routes to providing an answer to this question. First, there is the possibility that independence can be obtained along the lines of Theorem B in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) , who derive independent (and identical) conjectures out of assuming a common prior and common knowledge of conjectures. One may then conjecture that common knowledge of supports of the conjectures, or common knowledge of supports plus a common prior may lead to the conjectures to be independent (albeit not necessarily identical).
This turns out not to be the case. To see this consider a three player game where A 1 = fC; Dg ; A 2 = fL; Rg and A 3 = fW; Eg ; with conjectures at each state induced by the common prior in Figure 3 .1. Each type is denoted by the same letter as its action, and a subscript is added.
10 See e.g., Tan and Werlang (1988) . W 1 E 1 Figure 3 .1
In this example the support of the conjecture of every player about the other two players is the same at every state of the world, hence the supports of the conjectures are common knowledge among the players. Conjectures themseves, however, are not common knowledge at any state; they are not even mutual knowledge at any state.
And, in fact, conjectures are not independent at any state.
So nothing less than a common prior plus common knowledge of the conjectures themselves seems to be required for conjectures to be independent. But these assumptions, together with mutual knowledge of rationality and payo¤s characterize Nash equilibrium, not independent rationalizability.
Another route to avoid assuming independence directly is to identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for independence, such as the ones implied by the work of Geiger, Meek and Sturmfels (2006) for the study of graphical models and Bayesian networks. The conditions would entail assuming that the support of the conjectures have a product structure and verifying that the conjectures, for every player i; are such that X
and u a i and v a i are arbitrary integers. I …nd those conditions not easier to motivate that independence itself.
To conclude: it seems di¢ cult to dispense with the independence assumptions in a characterization of independent rationalizability. Despite this, common knowledge of this independence, or rationality, or payo¤s, are not necessary to characterize independent rationalizability as was previously believed.
e. Robustness of the Results. The results presented above are robust to weakening mutual knowledge to almost mutual 1 belief. 11 To state this version of the results recall that an event E is q believed by player i at s when p (E; s i ) q and almost 1 belief by player i at s if it is q believed by player i at s for q close to one. Now the results:
Robust Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability: Fix g and Z A: Let e S be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is 11 These robustness results are inspired in Proposition 9 in Dekel and Gul (1997) , a robustness check of whether common knowledge of rationality leads to rationalizability.
Z=A e S :Given a model of g there is a q 2 (0; 1) such that if at every state in e S the actual game is g, everyone is rational and it is mutual q-belief for q>q that a 2 Z; then i2N Z i is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and the actions chosen at e S are rationalizable for g. it is a mutual q-belief for q>q that payo¤ functions are g; that the players are rational, and that for every i supp i D i ; then i2N C i is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and, therefore, a set of rationalizable action pro…les of g.
Robust
The proofs of these results closely follow the proofs of the original results and I omit them here.
f. Weakly dominated strategies. Games without weakly dominated strategies allow for a simpler version of Theorem AB. It can be veri…ed that all that is needed for a characterization of rationalizability at a given state is mutual knowledge of rationality, of payo¤s, and of the support of the conjectures of the players. I omit the details here.
g. Learning, Evolution and Rationalizability. A basic result from the literature on learning in games is that adaptive learning leads to rationalizability (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991) . 12 Gul (1996) , who independently developed results similar to those in Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , interprets these results as providing examples of learning models where "rationality becomes common knowledge". This is, in general, viewed as surprising since adaptive learners know nothing about the rationality or the payo¤s of others despite the strong link that exists between rationalizability and common knowledge of both rationality and payo¤s. Results of this sort are often used to emphasize how the learning theoretic approach can "substitute for high levels of knowledge and deductive powers on the part of individuals" 13 and therefore provide better foundations for rationalizability than the epistemic approach.
It is my belief that, in light of the results presented in the present paper, a di¤erent interpretation of the seminal results by Milgrom and Roberts (1991) and Gul (1996) is required. One can view these results as hinting at the existence of simpler epistemic conditions for rationalizability, that do not require common knowledge of anything.
With the bene…t of hindsight, they clearly point to the content of the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability: after a su¢ ciently long time, adaptive learners play a near best reply to their beliefs, which are correctly speci…ed in the sense that they 12 Adaptive learning takes place when each player "eventually chooses only strategies that are nearly best replies to some probability distribution over his competitors'joint strategies, where near zero probability is assigned to strategies that have not been played for a su¢ ciently long time." (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991, p. 85) .
13 Young (1998, p. 112) .
place probability near one to strategies that arise from all players choosing, in fact, only near best replies to their beliefs. This says nothing, whatever, about whether players learn anything about the rationality of others, since these adaptive models
are silent about what the players may know or learn about payo¤s. Consequently, the interpretation of Proposition 9 in Gul (1996) (i.e., that rationality becomes common knowledge because only rationalizable strategies will eventually be played in the adaptive learning model) needs to be reexamined. conditions (a) and (b), together with the structure of the game and the monitoring technology, are common knowledge among the players. Interestingly, the set of RCE contains the set of Nash equilibria, and it is contained in the set of correlated rationalizable strategies.
Just as with the notion of rationalizability, RCE has been a concept intimately linked to the idea of the rationality of the players and of the structure of the game being commonly known. This intuition has been captured in Rubinstein and Wolinsky 14 See also Young (1998, p. 112) .
(1994) and Battigalli (1999) . Below I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium and rationalizability, there are sparse conditions not involving common knowledge of anything that lead to RCE.
To do this I need to introduce some additional notation. A game for Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) speci…es, apart from payo¤s, strategies and players, signal func-
is the signal that player i privately observes when all player choose the actions that make up the pro…le a. Pro…le a is a rationalizable conjectural equilibrium if for each player j there is a set B j A j T j such that, for all i, (a i ; i (a )) 2 B i and every (a j ; t j ) in B j is such that a j is a best response to a belief j with support contained in (i) a j : j (a j ; a j ) = t j ;and
In a RCE "each player's action is optimal, given a player's conjecture about what the other players'actions will be. The player's conjecture has to be consistent with the signal that he has on the actions the others intend to take, with the knowledge of his own action and with the knowledge that the other players follow similar reasoning."
15
In what follows a game form G is obtained from adding to game form G a signal function i for each player i.
15 Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994, p. 302) .
A model of game form G is a model of G where each state s also speci…es the signal i (a (s)) that each player i receives at that state. As before, player i's conjecture at s is i (s) : The conjecture of i is con…rmed at s if player i only puts positive probability at s on actions for the opponents that would generate the signal received by player i given player i's choice at s; namely, if every element in the support of i (s) is contained in fa i : i (a i (s i ) ; a i ) = i (a (s))g :
Preliminary Observation for RCE: Fix g and Z A:Let e S be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is Z=A e S . If at every state s in e S the actual game is g, everyone is rational, the conjectures of the players are con…rmed and it is mutually known that a 2 Z: Then the action pro…le chosen at s is a RCE for g.
Proof.
For each player j let B j = a j (s 0 ) ; j (a (s 0 )) : s 0 2 S Z : Therefore, since s is in S, (a i (s) ; i (a (s))) 2 B i for every player i. Now pick (a j ; t j ) in B j :
By de…nition, action a j is chosen at some state s 0 in S where j (a (s 0 )) = t j : Consequently, a j is a best response to belief j (s 0 ) : Since the conjectures of the players are con…rmed at s 0 ; the support of j (s 0 ) is contained in a j : j (a j ; a j ) = t j . It remains to show that for all a j in the support of j (s 0 ) and for all k 6 = j it is the case that (a k ; k (a j ; a j )) 2 B k : Since [a 2 Z] is mutual knowledge at s 0 we have that p ([a 2 Z] ; s 0 i ) = 1: Consequently, for any a j in supp j (s 0 ) there is a state s 00 in e S such that a j (s 00 ) = a j and a j (s 00 ) = a j (s 0 ) : Since s 00 is in e S; this means that for k 6 = j; (a k (s 00 ) ; k (a j (s 0 ) ; a j (s 00 ))) 2 B k : Suppose that at some state s supp (s) = D; it is mutually known that payo¤ functions are g; that the players are rational, that the conjectures are con…rmed and that for every i supp i D i : Then the action pro…le chosen at s is a RCE for g.
The proof of this result is very similar to the proofs constructed above and I omit it here.
i. Extensions. In this paper I have shown that there are epistemic conditions for rationalizability that do not assume common knowledge of anything, that these conditions are robust, and that they extend to re…nements of rationalizability such as independent rationalizability and rationalizable conjectural equilibrium. These results lead us naturally to ask whether the same can be said about notions of rationalizability for games in extensive form (Pearce, 1984; Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine, 1999) , and for games with incomplete information (Battigalli, 2003) . These extensions are left for future work.
